With numerous on-line accounts to handle, most people have a tendency to utilize the identical password for every thing. Several also have a tendency to use a very effortless to guess password. These are two common password errors that cyber-thieves are looking for. Probably the most important points you can do to keep secure online is always to make sure your passwords stay private.
Passwords are created to offer protection, utilised as the "key" to a door that provides access to some really sensitive individual information. If this information got into the incorrect hands, economic loss or identity theft could easily occur. Password theft and identity theft is a lot more widespread right now than ever - on account of spyware, Trojans and phishing scams. Once a password has been compromised, an insurmountable quantity of individual damage can take place in a matter of minutes. The more accounts your password works with, the better the damage. For the most beneficial security, on the web account passwords should be different together with tough.
A lot of people have a tendency not to utilize hard and/or varied passwords, because password management could be a tedious and time consuming process. When we're paying bills or buying on the web, we want easy and immediate access to our account so we can total our tasks. It's frustrating to get "bad password" error messages, and it is a hassle to answer challenge concerns so that you can request a password reset. Due to the fact it really is virtually impossible to comply with secure password practices with no writing down all our passwords, the only approach to securely manage passwords is to use some kind of password management computer software.
You will find two good possibilities here, and both are simple and inexpensive. The simplest factor to perform is usually to utilize file encryption computer software to safeguard the document that has the passwords stored on it. For this, I advocate one thing like Absolute Password Protector by Final Bit Computer software. They've a free trial version you are able to download to determine how you like it. This computer software uses robust 128 bit encryption to securely encrypt any file you might have stored in your computer; producing it straightforward for you to access but quite challenging for a thief to utilize. With this software program, you can retailer all of your passwords in a Word, Excel or text file and then encrypt that file to maintain it secure.
One more excellent approach to handle passwords would be to use an encrypted database to shop all of your password info. I use Passwords Plus by DataViz. This can be designed to become employed on a PDA, but I use it on my pc. Passwords Plus is simple and convenient, however the downside is you've to setup the database by keying in all your accounts and passwords. Both of those methods of password management expense about $29, and it can be well worth it. In contrast to a great deal of application that needs a subscription to help keep it functioning, password management computer software is a one time; acquire.
Preserving 'difficult to guess' passwords is just a single quite essential point you are able to do to help keep your self safe online. There are many far more things you can (and ought to) do to safeguard your computer and your information from cyber-thieves and malicious software. Some points to keep in thoughts are to use an excellent antivirus and anti-spyware computer software product, stay away from downloading and installing 'free' computer software (it generally contains spyware and/or adware) and never click links in emails that appear to come from a economic institution.
careful who you let write the history books
over the course of the previous two weeks, kevin mcaleavey has been publishing a series of blog posts on the infosecisland site (parts one, two, three, four, five, and six) about the history of the anti-virus industry. rob lewis thought this might be a subject that would interest me and he was right. unfortunately, rather than finding it mostly informative, i found with each passing part an increasing desire to post a serious critique. i'll take them one part at a time.
part one
to start with i think we need to pay attention to how the author presents himself. each part refers to him as a long time industry insider, but doesn't go into anything more verifiable or specific than that. with such vague credentials (and those are meant as credentials - there's no reason to put them there except to try to convince the reader that the author is an authority on the subject he's writing about) it really feels like he's saying "trust me, i'm a security expert". now i've never heard of him but that alone doesn't say that much, the anti-virus industry employs hundreds if not thousands of people and i'm really only familiar with a comparative handful of them. in part three we get to find out more specifics, but for the time being let's just say that such nebulous credentials makes me very suspicious.
to be fair i should point out my own credentials, so that i'm not being a hypocrite. unlike kevin, i am not now, nor have i ever been an industry insider. i have never been employed by any company in the anti-virus industry, i have never received financial remuneration for anything i've said or done involving the anti-virus field, and frankly i've only ever met a handful of people who were part of the industry. that being said, what i am (in terms relevant to this discussion) is a long time observer of the anti-virus industry. i've always been on the outside looking in, but from about the age of 15 onwards i basically grew up interacting with security hobbyists, security professionals, security software engineers, security researchers, and even some of the big names that kevin mentions in part two.
in theory, being an outsider seems like it should mean i have a more superficial view of the anti-virus industry. we shall see.
the first part of kevin's series focuses mostly on where we are today so a lot of the things he mentions should sound familiar to people following the security news. one of the things he mentions is the rustock botnet. he presents it as a single piece of malware with a 5 year half-life. this is a bit misleading for a couple of reasons, the first being that rustock is actually a family of malware - there have been many versions since 2006, in part because the anti-virus industry keeps interfering with the utility of existing versions by detecting them. additionally, the term "half life" has a very specific meaning which doesn't really apply that well to a botnet that has for all intents and purposes been killed now that microsoft controls the command and control server.
subsequently he made the following quote:
now there was some early misinterpretation of the use of the word "indestructible" that got posted in less knowledgeable media circles, specifically that the malware was indestructible rather than the observation that malware authors were trying to create an indestructible or bulletproof network of compromised computers, but a knowledgeable industry insider should have been able to see through that. furthermore, from my perspective the only panic i saw was the panicky feeding frenzy in the media over a statement which, like so many more purposeful scams, was simply too spectacular to be true.
i got the distinct impression upon reading part one that he tends to take mainstream media as gospel when it suggests that all is lost in the fight against malware. that seems strange to me. why is an industry insider putting so much credence in what the mainstream media says? he acknowledges that the industry has called this interpretation wrong, and that they're trying to correct that misinterpretation but he seems to suggest that the "corrections" are a product of public relations rather than a genuine attempt to correct factually erroneous statements that spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt.
another statement i'd like to draw attention to is the following:
part two
part two is where he actually starts talking about history. he starts right at the beginning but there's a problem. he mistakenly thinks the brain virus 'destroyed' many hard disks. brain came out at a time when hard disks were a rarity. moreover, brain specifically avoided infecting hard disks. the link kevin himself provided says this so i can only assume that he's not actually reading the sources he's providing to the reader.
he also seems to mistakenly think brain required a reinstall to recover from. this is, of course, false. there have always been less drastic ways of restoring boot sectors. the main problem was information about doing so wasn't as easy to come by back then as it is now. still, thinking there wasn't a way to do it is essentially a form of ignorance that you wouldn't expect to find in a long time industry insider.
yet another point on the brain virus; he seems to think the backlash from it forced the developers who made it out of business. i guess he never saw this video by f-secure's mikko hypponen, where mikko found the developers of the virus still working at exactly the same address they were at 25 years ago when they originally wrote the virus.
brain isn't the only piece of malware whose details he gets wrong, though. he mistakenly thinks popureb requires a windows reinstall to remove, much like brain. in reality what's required is to restore the MBR with the recovery console. this seems to be another example where kevin has taken mainstream media at their word instead of digging deeper and getting actual inside information, the way you'd expect an insider to do.
he also seems to think that stoned was the first virus to go memory resident and infect any disk that was inserted in the drive. stoned was a boot sector infector, however. all boot sector infectors infect (more or less) every disk inserted into the drive, it's kinda how they spread, and since it wasn't the first of that sort of virus i can't imagine how he got the impression it was the first one to go memory resident.
more generally he seems to think the majority of viruses in the 90's were jokes and pranks and programs designed to delete files. my recollection is that most actually gave no outward indication of infection whatsoever. virus writers quickly decided they liked the notoriety that came with one of their viruses spreading far and wide, and the best way to help that to happen was to make sure it didn't make itself known by messing up people's computers. the ones that stuck out in people's memories were oftentimes jokes or pranks or had destructive payloads, however.
it's not just malware he seems to get wrong, however. he appears to be under the impression that VIRUS-L was a private echomail conference available to SysOps (system operators) of BBSes that carried FidoNet. VIRUS-L was actually an internet mailing list which was gated into usenet in the form of the newsgroup comp.virus. i have no doubt it was further gated into FidoNet - i know alt.comp.virus was as my first encounter with it was through a usenet-to-FidoNet gateway. i have a feeling i encountered comp.virus the same way (without ever being a SysOp). that said, it's possible kevin could have been thinking of something else; maybe VIRUS or VIRUS_INFO (or even VIRUS_NFO) which were in fact echomail conferences on FidoNet (the first two of which have me as their most recent moderator). they also aren't private, however; i really can't seem to figure out where that part of his recollection might have come from.
another curious thing i noticed is that he seems to think eugene kaspersky is the only member of the old guard of virus hunters still in the field after john mcafee, alan solomon, and peter norton (?) left. he also mentioned frisk software international but sort of as an afterthought, and somehow failed to mention frisk the person. frisk the person (and the company) are still out there, still working. they may not be attracting attention but they're still there. as such, kaspersky isn't the last so kevin's depiction of the industry as having been lobotomized seems all the more inaccurate. what's more, however, is that kevin only seems to be acknowledging a handful of the icons in the anti-virus industry. there were and are a lot more people from the old days out there. a great example would be aryeh goretsky, who was from the sounds of it like john mcafee's right hand man, and who currently is with eset. then there's the venerable vesselin bontchev, once a well respected virus expert at university of hamburg and now a well respected virus expert at FSI. then there's jimmy kuo of symantec and then mcafee and now microsoft. there are many great minds from the early days that are still with us today, so this focus on just a handful of icons and the suggestion that since most of those are gone that the industry has been lobotomized, seems like a decidedly superficial view.
part three
the third part in kevin's series was about the demise of the anti-virus industry (it's not dead, it's just sleeping). it's also where we finally find out about his actual credentials. he was part of privacy software corporation, the company behind BOClean; what was apparently originally a cleanup tool for the back orifice remote access trojan, but was later expanded to cover more malware. apparently this company was bought by comodo in 2007, but from the sounds of things it doesn't sound like kevin stayed on with comodo for all that long, and even if he was still with them today 4 years isn't exactly "long term".
he presents himself as a long term industry insider in a discussion about anti-virus vendors, but his actual first hand inside experience with the kinds of companies he talks about and criticizes in this series of posts only went on for 2 1/4 years according to his linkedin profile. that seems rather underwhelming. oh sure, before that he spent a long time in a different part of the anti-malware industry, but he spends very little time actually talking about the part of the industry where most of his actual experience is from - except to extoll the virtues of the techniques used by BOClean, of course. in any event, it's clear by this point why he was so vague about his credentials in earlier parts.
back to the demise of the anti-virus industry, however. kevin focuses on the point in which trojans started to take off as the death knell of the industry. it was, after all, the point at which his company was forced to start dealing with malware. he seems to think that the early failures to handle trojans reflected inability on the industry's part. just to be clear, when trojans began to take off the industry did hesitate, and i don't mean for a second or a minute or an hour or a day or week or a month or even a year. the anti-virus industry hesitated to redefine itself. it took a lot of doing to overcome the philosophical inertia that kept them out non-viral malware detection. trojans were not viruses, remote access 'tools' arguably had legitimate uses, and the industry was gun-shy with regards to litigation. i hope kevin can appreciate that last point as it was his revered dr solomon who explained that one to me. apparently they couldn't even add generic detection for MtE based polymorphic viruses using the existence of the MtE algorithm as an indicator because some brainiac went and put the algorithm in a 'legitimate' code obfuscation tool. the industry did eventually overcome their philosophical qualms about dealing with non-viral malware but it took the escalation of the trojan problem to make people (both inside and outside the industry) realize that the industry would be justified in going after this new kind of threat that was previously outside of their purview.
a great deal of kevin's characterization of the failure of the industry seems to focus on what his company handled better. the reader is left to take his word for it that his company did a better job. he's clearly not an impartial 3rd party, his perceptions should be taken with a grain of salt. he talks about a number of techniques used by the anti-virus industry and what their failings are - a number of which are almost certainly exaggerated. i've seen my share of alternative anti-malware approaches whose proponents go on ad nauseum about how their approach is the superior one (zvi netiv stands out as a remarkable example of this). better is always subjective, there's always good and bad points.
he describes BOClean's approach of only looking for the malware in memory, rather than trying to find it on disk like traditional anti-virus products do, as superior. there are benefits, of course. packers and cryptors have no effect on detection because that transformation is undone at runtime. however, there are also drawbacks. once the malware is in memory it is active. it's possible for active malware to interfere with security software in any number of ways. it could use stealth, it could shut down the security software (which i gather was a problem for BOClean), or it could even use the security software's own filesystem enumerating behaviour to find new host programs to infect (if you're dealing with a file infecting virus). once the malware is active the security software has lost an important tactical advantage. imagine you're in a street fight - do you wait for your opponent to strike first or do you try to strike before they're even in a position to defend themselves? and remember, i'm talking about a street fight here, not some fair fight with referees and judges. you do not wait for the malware to go active in memory if you can avoid it. the code that gets control first wins, and once the malware is active in memory, it's gained control. it's only by kevin's good fortune (or BOClean's low profile) that malware creators didn't try to stomp out or otherwise interfere with BOClean. the AV industry has already faced that, going back all the way to brain (which had stealth).
some of his exaggerations devolve into more factual errors. for example he calls win32/ska a simple file infector and criticises the industry for taking months to handle it. the fact is that win32/ska's infection technique was nothing like the traditional file infection technique kevin laid out elsewhere. win32/ska was not some appending file infector, it didn't simply insert itself into the winsock DLL, it carried a modified copy of the winsock DLL with it and replaced the original with the modified version. as such, recovery of the original winsock DLL was not comparable to recovering from a traditional file infector. it may have taken months to build the capabilities to recover from this type of infection into their general purpose tools, but that in part was because there were special purpose tools available to mitigate the problem and lower the priority of getting it into their general purpose products. there also happened to be manual instructions for removing win32/ska (i know because i have given those instructions to people) which also mitigated the problem and thus lowered the priority.
he also points out that even now systems are still getting compromised with back orifice 12 years later and characterizes that as an example of the anti-malware industry's failure. the fact is that his BOClean is just as much a failure in that as the rest of the anti-malware industry is. that is if you can really call it a failure. stopping that trojan from ever getting used again, making it become extinct, that's just not something anyone can actually do. and it doesn't really have that much to do with whether the malware can be detected or removed by software tools, but more with the heterogeneity of the computer population and the mind-share of the malware in question amongst those who would use it. old viruses never die, and apparently old trojans don't either.
he places the blame for why all windows malware works at all on microsoft. unfortunately it's not that simple. any general purpose computer is capable of supporting malware, no matter what the operating system. in this way malware can be said to be a 'feature' of general purpose computing. no matter how tightly you try to control things, there will always be the potential for software to maliciously do something you don't want it to do.
kevin seems to think that AV industry has for the past 30 years (which is longer than the industry has actually existed) simply been coming up with signatures and not looking for patterns that could be useful for future variants. the fact that we have the concept of malware families at all invalidates this line of reasoning. it wouldn't be possible to classify new samples as belonging to an existing family without looking for such patterns. this line of reasoning also ignores heuristic alerts that say "possibly modified variant of X". it also ignores the practice of consolidating many specific signatures into a few generic signatures.
he also calls automated analysis 'cheating' and characterizes it as simply creating an MD5 or SHA1 hash. this seems to ignore the fact that you can't logically identify that a sample is a variant of another malware family by simply creating a hash. it also clearly ignores the concept of automated classification, whereby a sample is compared with many other samples in order to determine which ones it's most similar to and thus which family it belongs to. one also has to wonder how exactly vendors are supposed to deal with 100,000 new samples a day without some kind of automation. even if you had a way to detect most of those new samples ahead of time with generic signatures, you still need to test and make sure each of those new samples is actually malware and is actually detected.
rather unsurprisingly at this point, he describes heuristics as bad because they emulate the malware while trying to catch it in the act of doing something bad. this is only (somewhat) true of dynamic heuristics, not static heuristics. it's also hypocritical coming from someone championing the idea of letting the malware become active in memory before trying to do anything about it.
he also referred to heuristics as creating "massive" false positive problems. in reality false positives are relatively rare. a single false positive can, of course, cause problems for many people if it's a system file, but those are rare even amongst regular false positives. those really high profile failures are something that has only happened a handful of times.
part four
the fourth part of kevin's series focuses on operating systems, mostly windows, but covering mac os x and linux too. i actually agree with a lot of what kevin has to say in this part (which makes me wonder if my knowledge of OS security might be a little too shallow), but there are a few things that are worth pointing out.
i tend not to agree with his suggestion that the concept of file associations based on file extensions are a bad thing and should be replaced by some kind of intelligent parsing. for one thing i think the parsing idea is logically infeasible. intelligent parsing would require windows to know about every file format, even the one i just invented yesterday, which it obviously can't. he also envisioned that the parser could generate a warning for the user to indicate what sort of action windows was about to take, but the warning could just as easily been done with file associations. the warning is based on the outcome and has little to do with how the outcome is decided upon (be it parsing or association).
on the matter of unix, kevin appears to be of the opinion that pure unix was secure. this would seem to ignore the fact that the original academic treatment of computer viruses (where the term actually got coined) had a virus spreading on a professionally administered unix system without the admin's assistance. how secure is that?
he also seems to believe that linux used to be secure in the beginning, but seems to forget or not care that rootkits worked on linux way back close to it's beginning. he admits that there was malicious software but contends that it got removed from distros quickly after being introduced. this ignores the fact that once end users start using such an OS, malware doesn't need to be bundled into the distro. if a user can run it, they will, and linux didn't and doesn't prevent running malware
part five
the fifth and penultimate part of the series deals the concept of defense in depth, or as kevin prefers layered security. he spends an inordinate amount of time talking about firewalls and how awful they are. he sort of presented defense in depth as a caricature, focusing only on the layers that gained widespread adoption and suggesting that anything else was outside of the regular user's price range. frankly i don't think integrity checking was ever priced that way, nor behaviour blocking, nor any number of other techniques that he conveniently ignores.
what's more, he criticizes each layer for being insufficient. it's as if he doesn't understand the purpose of having multiple layers. each one has flaws and weaknesses, sure, all security measures do, but in aggregate those weaknesses are diminished. they're never completely eliminated, of course, because there's no such thing as perfect security, but it's certainly something that we can approach. one might argue that one can approach that by re-engineering one particular layer instead of having many, but some of those weaknesses are inherent rather than being design or implementation flaws. such inherent weaknesses can only be braced by other additional, complementary layers.
part six
the final part of keven mcaleavey's series was meant to present solutions to the problems mentioned in the previous 5 parts. when i read the final part in the series all the pieces finally clicked into place. all the confusion i previously had was gone, all the WTF moments finally made sense. i finally knew what he was on about and what the series' true purpose was. kevin's got a product to sell and the series was an extraordinarily long sales pitch.
it followed a familiar pattern too, now that i think about it. first he dished out FUD about his competitors (and since he's now a secure systems provider his competitors include both the anti-malware software vendors and the operating system vendors), and then at the end hype up his own product and make it look like the blatantly obvious choice to avoid the horrible, horrible problems with everything else. he even threw in a smattering of snake oil phrases like "absolute security and protection" for good measure.
the product and/or service in question (KNOS) appears to my untrained self to be similar to some sort of freeBSD-based LiveCD composed entirely out of carefully audited modules, and with the provision that you can request custom configurations from to suit your needs. the idea appears to be that the code that is allowed to run is carefully controlled and limited by them (rather than being something the user can add code to him/herself) and that exploitable vulnerabilities have supposedly been eliminated. this is supposed to keep the users safe from both malware and from them themselves.
unfortunately, kevin seems to have fallen prey to the engineer's conceit - the (often mistaken) belief that a particular problem can solved through carefully engineered technology alone. KNOS does not offer absolute protection, and to say it does offers users a false sense of security. it may well stop all the malware that kevin can imagine, but (to paraphrase something that's often said in cryptographic circles) it's easy to come up with a security system so advanced that you yourself can't figure out a way around it - what's hard is figuring out one that other people can't figure out a way around either.
obviously i don't know enough of the details of KNOS to suggest specific scenarios where it's security can fail, but i do know enough about computation in general to see what kevin (and others who aim to ensure only good/safe code is allowed to run) has missed. what many people don't realize, what society's conventional thinking about computers fails to hint at, is that data is code. the distinction we draw between the two is little more than a mental construct that simplifies the task of building systems. it doesn't represent how computation actually works, and it isn't necessarily adhered to by the people who break systems.
unless and until someone can come up with a way to control which data gets processed as scrupulously as they control which code gets executed, data will remain an open window through which systems with locked down code can be attacked. and since determining the safety of data will ultimately require the data to be processed in some way, we arrive at a catch-22.
i fully expect that KNOS probably has some impressive security capabilities, but absolute security is a fantasy, and the more traditional security layers that kevin derides have managed to keep me essentially malware free (except for an externally non-addressable RAT installation on a sacrificial secondary system) for over two decades. beware security historians who are trying to sell you something - chances are they'll rewrite history to suit their sales objective.
part one
to start with i think we need to pay attention to how the author presents himself. each part refers to him as a long time industry insider, but doesn't go into anything more verifiable or specific than that. with such vague credentials (and those are meant as credentials - there's no reason to put them there except to try to convince the reader that the author is an authority on the subject he's writing about) it really feels like he's saying "trust me, i'm a security expert". now i've never heard of him but that alone doesn't say that much, the anti-virus industry employs hundreds if not thousands of people and i'm really only familiar with a comparative handful of them. in part three we get to find out more specifics, but for the time being let's just say that such nebulous credentials makes me very suspicious.
to be fair i should point out my own credentials, so that i'm not being a hypocrite. unlike kevin, i am not now, nor have i ever been an industry insider. i have never been employed by any company in the anti-virus industry, i have never received financial remuneration for anything i've said or done involving the anti-virus field, and frankly i've only ever met a handful of people who were part of the industry. that being said, what i am (in terms relevant to this discussion) is a long time observer of the anti-virus industry. i've always been on the outside looking in, but from about the age of 15 onwards i basically grew up interacting with security hobbyists, security professionals, security software engineers, security researchers, and even some of the big names that kevin mentions in part two.
in theory, being an outsider seems like it should mean i have a more superficial view of the anti-virus industry. we shall see.
the first part of kevin's series focuses mostly on where we are today so a lot of the things he mentions should sound familiar to people following the security news. one of the things he mentions is the rustock botnet. he presents it as a single piece of malware with a 5 year half-life. this is a bit misleading for a couple of reasons, the first being that rustock is actually a family of malware - there have been many versions since 2006, in part because the anti-virus industry keeps interfering with the utility of existing versions by detecting them. additionally, the term "half life" has a very specific meaning which doesn't really apply that well to a botnet that has for all intents and purposes been killed now that microsoft controls the command and control server.
subsequently he made the following quote:
"TDL4" however has publicly caused the security industry to transition into full panic mode and literally throw in the towelthis may seem pedantic, but in order to literally throw in the towel, there has to be an actual physical towel, and someone has to throw it. an argument could be made, i suppose, for saying that they figuratively threw in the towel, or metaphorically threw in the towel. maybe even virtually threw in the towel - but if he insists that they literally threw in the towel then i have five words - pics or it didn't happen.
now there was some early misinterpretation of the use of the word "indestructible" that got posted in less knowledgeable media circles, specifically that the malware was indestructible rather than the observation that malware authors were trying to create an indestructible or bulletproof network of compromised computers, but a knowledgeable industry insider should have been able to see through that. furthermore, from my perspective the only panic i saw was the panicky feeding frenzy in the media over a statement which, like so many more purposeful scams, was simply too spectacular to be true.
i got the distinct impression upon reading part one that he tends to take mainstream media as gospel when it suggests that all is lost in the fight against malware. that seems strange to me. why is an industry insider putting so much credence in what the mainstream media says? he acknowledges that the industry has called this interpretation wrong, and that they're trying to correct that misinterpretation but he seems to suggest that the "corrections" are a product of public relations rather than a genuine attempt to correct factually erroneous statements that spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt.
another statement i'd like to draw attention to is the following:
To see this public admission that 1980's technology has utterly failed is nothing short of breathtaking.admission by whom? where? what are the details? none are given and we must take him on his word that such an admission actually took place. or perhaps he thinks the misinterpretations spread by mainstream media represent that admission. could it be that he's unfamiliar with the degree to which they botch things up on a regular basis? it really makes me question his credibility if he placing his preference on the words of reporters over the words of researchers.
part two
part two is where he actually starts talking about history. he starts right at the beginning but there's a problem. he mistakenly thinks the brain virus 'destroyed' many hard disks. brain came out at a time when hard disks were a rarity. moreover, brain specifically avoided infecting hard disks. the link kevin himself provided says this so i can only assume that he's not actually reading the sources he's providing to the reader.
he also seems to mistakenly think brain required a reinstall to recover from. this is, of course, false. there have always been less drastic ways of restoring boot sectors. the main problem was information about doing so wasn't as easy to come by back then as it is now. still, thinking there wasn't a way to do it is essentially a form of ignorance that you wouldn't expect to find in a long time industry insider.
yet another point on the brain virus; he seems to think the backlash from it forced the developers who made it out of business. i guess he never saw this video by f-secure's mikko hypponen, where mikko found the developers of the virus still working at exactly the same address they were at 25 years ago when they originally wrote the virus.
brain isn't the only piece of malware whose details he gets wrong, though. he mistakenly thinks popureb requires a windows reinstall to remove, much like brain. in reality what's required is to restore the MBR with the recovery console. this seems to be another example where kevin has taken mainstream media at their word instead of digging deeper and getting actual inside information, the way you'd expect an insider to do.
he also seems to think that stoned was the first virus to go memory resident and infect any disk that was inserted in the drive. stoned was a boot sector infector, however. all boot sector infectors infect (more or less) every disk inserted into the drive, it's kinda how they spread, and since it wasn't the first of that sort of virus i can't imagine how he got the impression it was the first one to go memory resident.
more generally he seems to think the majority of viruses in the 90's were jokes and pranks and programs designed to delete files. my recollection is that most actually gave no outward indication of infection whatsoever. virus writers quickly decided they liked the notoriety that came with one of their viruses spreading far and wide, and the best way to help that to happen was to make sure it didn't make itself known by messing up people's computers. the ones that stuck out in people's memories were oftentimes jokes or pranks or had destructive payloads, however.
it's not just malware he seems to get wrong, however. he appears to be under the impression that VIRUS-L was a private echomail conference available to SysOps (system operators) of BBSes that carried FidoNet. VIRUS-L was actually an internet mailing list which was gated into usenet in the form of the newsgroup comp.virus. i have no doubt it was further gated into FidoNet - i know alt.comp.virus was as my first encounter with it was through a usenet-to-FidoNet gateway. i have a feeling i encountered comp.virus the same way (without ever being a SysOp). that said, it's possible kevin could have been thinking of something else; maybe VIRUS or VIRUS_INFO (or even VIRUS_NFO) which were in fact echomail conferences on FidoNet (the first two of which have me as their most recent moderator). they also aren't private, however; i really can't seem to figure out where that part of his recollection might have come from.
another curious thing i noticed is that he seems to think eugene kaspersky is the only member of the old guard of virus hunters still in the field after john mcafee, alan solomon, and peter norton (?) left. he also mentioned frisk software international but sort of as an afterthought, and somehow failed to mention frisk the person. frisk the person (and the company) are still out there, still working. they may not be attracting attention but they're still there. as such, kaspersky isn't the last so kevin's depiction of the industry as having been lobotomized seems all the more inaccurate. what's more, however, is that kevin only seems to be acknowledging a handful of the icons in the anti-virus industry. there were and are a lot more people from the old days out there. a great example would be aryeh goretsky, who was from the sounds of it like john mcafee's right hand man, and who currently is with eset. then there's the venerable vesselin bontchev, once a well respected virus expert at university of hamburg and now a well respected virus expert at FSI. then there's jimmy kuo of symantec and then mcafee and now microsoft. there are many great minds from the early days that are still with us today, so this focus on just a handful of icons and the suggestion that since most of those are gone that the industry has been lobotomized, seems like a decidedly superficial view.
part three
the third part in kevin's series was about the demise of the anti-virus industry (it's not dead, it's just sleeping). it's also where we finally find out about his actual credentials. he was part of privacy software corporation, the company behind BOClean; what was apparently originally a cleanup tool for the back orifice remote access trojan, but was later expanded to cover more malware. apparently this company was bought by comodo in 2007, but from the sounds of things it doesn't sound like kevin stayed on with comodo for all that long, and even if he was still with them today 4 years isn't exactly "long term".
he presents himself as a long term industry insider in a discussion about anti-virus vendors, but his actual first hand inside experience with the kinds of companies he talks about and criticizes in this series of posts only went on for 2 1/4 years according to his linkedin profile. that seems rather underwhelming. oh sure, before that he spent a long time in a different part of the anti-malware industry, but he spends very little time actually talking about the part of the industry where most of his actual experience is from - except to extoll the virtues of the techniques used by BOClean, of course. in any event, it's clear by this point why he was so vague about his credentials in earlier parts.
back to the demise of the anti-virus industry, however. kevin focuses on the point in which trojans started to take off as the death knell of the industry. it was, after all, the point at which his company was forced to start dealing with malware. he seems to think that the early failures to handle trojans reflected inability on the industry's part. just to be clear, when trojans began to take off the industry did hesitate, and i don't mean for a second or a minute or an hour or a day or week or a month or even a year. the anti-virus industry hesitated to redefine itself. it took a lot of doing to overcome the philosophical inertia that kept them out non-viral malware detection. trojans were not viruses, remote access 'tools' arguably had legitimate uses, and the industry was gun-shy with regards to litigation. i hope kevin can appreciate that last point as it was his revered dr solomon who explained that one to me. apparently they couldn't even add generic detection for MtE based polymorphic viruses using the existence of the MtE algorithm as an indicator because some brainiac went and put the algorithm in a 'legitimate' code obfuscation tool. the industry did eventually overcome their philosophical qualms about dealing with non-viral malware but it took the escalation of the trojan problem to make people (both inside and outside the industry) realize that the industry would be justified in going after this new kind of threat that was previously outside of their purview.
a great deal of kevin's characterization of the failure of the industry seems to focus on what his company handled better. the reader is left to take his word for it that his company did a better job. he's clearly not an impartial 3rd party, his perceptions should be taken with a grain of salt. he talks about a number of techniques used by the anti-virus industry and what their failings are - a number of which are almost certainly exaggerated. i've seen my share of alternative anti-malware approaches whose proponents go on ad nauseum about how their approach is the superior one (zvi netiv stands out as a remarkable example of this). better is always subjective, there's always good and bad points.
he describes BOClean's approach of only looking for the malware in memory, rather than trying to find it on disk like traditional anti-virus products do, as superior. there are benefits, of course. packers and cryptors have no effect on detection because that transformation is undone at runtime. however, there are also drawbacks. once the malware is in memory it is active. it's possible for active malware to interfere with security software in any number of ways. it could use stealth, it could shut down the security software (which i gather was a problem for BOClean), or it could even use the security software's own filesystem enumerating behaviour to find new host programs to infect (if you're dealing with a file infecting virus). once the malware is active the security software has lost an important tactical advantage. imagine you're in a street fight - do you wait for your opponent to strike first or do you try to strike before they're even in a position to defend themselves? and remember, i'm talking about a street fight here, not some fair fight with referees and judges. you do not wait for the malware to go active in memory if you can avoid it. the code that gets control first wins, and once the malware is active in memory, it's gained control. it's only by kevin's good fortune (or BOClean's low profile) that malware creators didn't try to stomp out or otherwise interfere with BOClean. the AV industry has already faced that, going back all the way to brain (which had stealth).
some of his exaggerations devolve into more factual errors. for example he calls win32/ska a simple file infector and criticises the industry for taking months to handle it. the fact is that win32/ska's infection technique was nothing like the traditional file infection technique kevin laid out elsewhere. win32/ska was not some appending file infector, it didn't simply insert itself into the winsock DLL, it carried a modified copy of the winsock DLL with it and replaced the original with the modified version. as such, recovery of the original winsock DLL was not comparable to recovering from a traditional file infector. it may have taken months to build the capabilities to recover from this type of infection into their general purpose tools, but that in part was because there were special purpose tools available to mitigate the problem and lower the priority of getting it into their general purpose products. there also happened to be manual instructions for removing win32/ska (i know because i have given those instructions to people) which also mitigated the problem and thus lowered the priority.
he also points out that even now systems are still getting compromised with back orifice 12 years later and characterizes that as an example of the anti-malware industry's failure. the fact is that his BOClean is just as much a failure in that as the rest of the anti-malware industry is. that is if you can really call it a failure. stopping that trojan from ever getting used again, making it become extinct, that's just not something anyone can actually do. and it doesn't really have that much to do with whether the malware can be detected or removed by software tools, but more with the heterogeneity of the computer population and the mind-share of the malware in question amongst those who would use it. old viruses never die, and apparently old trojans don't either.
he places the blame for why all windows malware works at all on microsoft. unfortunately it's not that simple. any general purpose computer is capable of supporting malware, no matter what the operating system. in this way malware can be said to be a 'feature' of general purpose computing. no matter how tightly you try to control things, there will always be the potential for software to maliciously do something you don't want it to do.
kevin seems to think that AV industry has for the past 30 years (which is longer than the industry has actually existed) simply been coming up with signatures and not looking for patterns that could be useful for future variants. the fact that we have the concept of malware families at all invalidates this line of reasoning. it wouldn't be possible to classify new samples as belonging to an existing family without looking for such patterns. this line of reasoning also ignores heuristic alerts that say "possibly modified variant of X". it also ignores the practice of consolidating many specific signatures into a few generic signatures.
he also calls automated analysis 'cheating' and characterizes it as simply creating an MD5 or SHA1 hash. this seems to ignore the fact that you can't logically identify that a sample is a variant of another malware family by simply creating a hash. it also clearly ignores the concept of automated classification, whereby a sample is compared with many other samples in order to determine which ones it's most similar to and thus which family it belongs to. one also has to wonder how exactly vendors are supposed to deal with 100,000 new samples a day without some kind of automation. even if you had a way to detect most of those new samples ahead of time with generic signatures, you still need to test and make sure each of those new samples is actually malware and is actually detected.
rather unsurprisingly at this point, he describes heuristics as bad because they emulate the malware while trying to catch it in the act of doing something bad. this is only (somewhat) true of dynamic heuristics, not static heuristics. it's also hypocritical coming from someone championing the idea of letting the malware become active in memory before trying to do anything about it.
he also referred to heuristics as creating "massive" false positive problems. in reality false positives are relatively rare. a single false positive can, of course, cause problems for many people if it's a system file, but those are rare even amongst regular false positives. those really high profile failures are something that has only happened a handful of times.
part four
the fourth part of kevin's series focuses on operating systems, mostly windows, but covering mac os x and linux too. i actually agree with a lot of what kevin has to say in this part (which makes me wonder if my knowledge of OS security might be a little too shallow), but there are a few things that are worth pointing out.
i tend not to agree with his suggestion that the concept of file associations based on file extensions are a bad thing and should be replaced by some kind of intelligent parsing. for one thing i think the parsing idea is logically infeasible. intelligent parsing would require windows to know about every file format, even the one i just invented yesterday, which it obviously can't. he also envisioned that the parser could generate a warning for the user to indicate what sort of action windows was about to take, but the warning could just as easily been done with file associations. the warning is based on the outcome and has little to do with how the outcome is decided upon (be it parsing or association).
on the matter of unix, kevin appears to be of the opinion that pure unix was secure. this would seem to ignore the fact that the original academic treatment of computer viruses (where the term actually got coined) had a virus spreading on a professionally administered unix system without the admin's assistance. how secure is that?
he also seems to believe that linux used to be secure in the beginning, but seems to forget or not care that rootkits worked on linux way back close to it's beginning. he admits that there was malicious software but contends that it got removed from distros quickly after being introduced. this ignores the fact that once end users start using such an OS, malware doesn't need to be bundled into the distro. if a user can run it, they will, and linux didn't and doesn't prevent running malware
part five
the fifth and penultimate part of the series deals the concept of defense in depth, or as kevin prefers layered security. he spends an inordinate amount of time talking about firewalls and how awful they are. he sort of presented defense in depth as a caricature, focusing only on the layers that gained widespread adoption and suggesting that anything else was outside of the regular user's price range. frankly i don't think integrity checking was ever priced that way, nor behaviour blocking, nor any number of other techniques that he conveniently ignores.
what's more, he criticizes each layer for being insufficient. it's as if he doesn't understand the purpose of having multiple layers. each one has flaws and weaknesses, sure, all security measures do, but in aggregate those weaknesses are diminished. they're never completely eliminated, of course, because there's no such thing as perfect security, but it's certainly something that we can approach. one might argue that one can approach that by re-engineering one particular layer instead of having many, but some of those weaknesses are inherent rather than being design or implementation flaws. such inherent weaknesses can only be braced by other additional, complementary layers.
part six
the final part of keven mcaleavey's series was meant to present solutions to the problems mentioned in the previous 5 parts. when i read the final part in the series all the pieces finally clicked into place. all the confusion i previously had was gone, all the WTF moments finally made sense. i finally knew what he was on about and what the series' true purpose was. kevin's got a product to sell and the series was an extraordinarily long sales pitch.
it followed a familiar pattern too, now that i think about it. first he dished out FUD about his competitors (and since he's now a secure systems provider his competitors include both the anti-malware software vendors and the operating system vendors), and then at the end hype up his own product and make it look like the blatantly obvious choice to avoid the horrible, horrible problems with everything else. he even threw in a smattering of snake oil phrases like "absolute security and protection" for good measure.
the product and/or service in question (KNOS) appears to my untrained self to be similar to some sort of freeBSD-based LiveCD composed entirely out of carefully audited modules, and with the provision that you can request custom configurations from to suit your needs. the idea appears to be that the code that is allowed to run is carefully controlled and limited by them (rather than being something the user can add code to him/herself) and that exploitable vulnerabilities have supposedly been eliminated. this is supposed to keep the users safe from both malware and from them themselves.
unfortunately, kevin seems to have fallen prey to the engineer's conceit - the (often mistaken) belief that a particular problem can solved through carefully engineered technology alone. KNOS does not offer absolute protection, and to say it does offers users a false sense of security. it may well stop all the malware that kevin can imagine, but (to paraphrase something that's often said in cryptographic circles) it's easy to come up with a security system so advanced that you yourself can't figure out a way around it - what's hard is figuring out one that other people can't figure out a way around either.
obviously i don't know enough of the details of KNOS to suggest specific scenarios where it's security can fail, but i do know enough about computation in general to see what kevin (and others who aim to ensure only good/safe code is allowed to run) has missed. what many people don't realize, what society's conventional thinking about computers fails to hint at, is that data is code. the distinction we draw between the two is little more than a mental construct that simplifies the task of building systems. it doesn't represent how computation actually works, and it isn't necessarily adhered to by the people who break systems.
unless and until someone can come up with a way to control which data gets processed as scrupulously as they control which code gets executed, data will remain an open window through which systems with locked down code can be attacked. and since determining the safety of data will ultimately require the data to be processed in some way, we arrive at a catch-22.
i fully expect that KNOS probably has some impressive security capabilities, but absolute security is a fantasy, and the more traditional security layers that kevin derides have managed to keep me essentially malware free (except for an externally non-addressable RAT installation on a sacrificial secondary system) for over two decades. beware security historians who are trying to sell you something - chances are they'll rewrite history to suit their sales objective.
Identity Theft and the Net What You should Know to Safeguard Your Credit
Your identity is special to you: it is your name, address, social security range, financial status, credit history, mother's maiden name and credit card numbers. It is all you need to determine who that you are other than your fingerprints. The problem is, identity may be stolen and with all the wide usage of the world wide web, it really is becoming less complicated and simpler to acquire other people's supposedly private details.
Should you turn out to be a victim of identity theft, there are several consequences. You'll literally spend years clearing your records (possibly credit and criminal). You'll probably be denied credit and may well even be denied jobs. You may also even be arrested for crimes you didn't commit.
Those who want a person else's data have several methods to gain it. They can steal info from records where they operate or they are able to search over your shoulder at the checkout line and memorize the info in your check or the numbers in your credit card. Some criminals are starting to go far more high tech. They are able to use devices known as skimmers to acquire credit card numbers when the details is becoming transferred towards the organization. They also typically use the world wide web to scam unsuspecting individuals into giving them private info.
Phishing is the term utilised to describe the act that some criminals use to gain account info from men and women. What they do is send emails posing as respected and established sites that typically cope with money (like eBay) asking for data. They're normally worded to obtain the individuals worried that there may well be illegal activity on their account after which they ask them to comply with a link and enter their individual data which includes account name and password. The link brings them to a web site that mimics the original site (which is really fairly simple to accomplish). When the folks enter their personal info, the thieves then use it to go into the accounts and transform the password in order that the owner is no longer ready to access their very own account. The criminals then use the account to transfer money from bank accounts (if they are linked to them) or use the credit card information that individuals have stored there.
You can safeguard yourself from net identity theft in the following techniques:
- In case you assume you have received a phishing e mail, don't click on any links given within the e-mail. As an alternative, open a new browser, sort inside the address to the website in question and locate contact data to call or e mail them regarding the email. Bear in mind, they already have your information and won't require you to offer it back to them.
- Make sure to use an anti-virus program too as a firewall to safeguard your laptop or computer from damaging files and spyware which will track your world wide web movements.
Five Guidelines to help You Avoid Identity Theft (for you and your family members)
1. Limit access to your family’s social security numbers by never providing it on non-essential forms and by finding out why people are asking for it. If they want it for identifying purposes, simply request that they assign your or your family members member a different identifying quantity.
2. Always shred any papers that have social security and account numbers.
3. Never give out your individual data over the phone or web.
4. Safeguard your credit card numbers and checks when shopping so that individuals are not ready to see them and memorize the information while waiting in line behind you.
5. Teach your children to not give out personal identifying data to anyone, especially over the web.
Should you turn out to be a victim of identity theft, there are several consequences. You'll literally spend years clearing your records (possibly credit and criminal). You'll probably be denied credit and may well even be denied jobs. You may also even be arrested for crimes you didn't commit.
Those who want a person else's data have several methods to gain it. They can steal info from records where they operate or they are able to search over your shoulder at the checkout line and memorize the info in your check or the numbers in your credit card. Some criminals are starting to go far more high tech. They are able to use devices known as skimmers to acquire credit card numbers when the details is becoming transferred towards the organization. They also typically use the world wide web to scam unsuspecting individuals into giving them private info.
Phishing is the term utilised to describe the act that some criminals use to gain account info from men and women. What they do is send emails posing as respected and established sites that typically cope with money (like eBay) asking for data. They're normally worded to obtain the individuals worried that there may well be illegal activity on their account after which they ask them to comply with a link and enter their individual data which includes account name and password. The link brings them to a web site that mimics the original site (which is really fairly simple to accomplish). When the folks enter their personal info, the thieves then use it to go into the accounts and transform the password in order that the owner is no longer ready to access their very own account. The criminals then use the account to transfer money from bank accounts (if they are linked to them) or use the credit card information that individuals have stored there.
You can safeguard yourself from net identity theft in the following techniques:
- In case you assume you have received a phishing e mail, don't click on any links given within the e-mail. As an alternative, open a new browser, sort inside the address to the website in question and locate contact data to call or e mail them regarding the email. Bear in mind, they already have your information and won't require you to offer it back to them.
- Make sure to use an anti-virus program too as a firewall to safeguard your laptop or computer from damaging files and spyware which will track your world wide web movements.
Five Guidelines to help You Avoid Identity Theft (for you and your family members)
1. Limit access to your family’s social security numbers by never providing it on non-essential forms and by finding out why people are asking for it. If they want it for identifying purposes, simply request that they assign your or your family members member a different identifying quantity.
2. Always shred any papers that have social security and account numbers.
3. Never give out your individual data over the phone or web.
4. Safeguard your credit card numbers and checks when shopping so that individuals are not ready to see them and memorize the information while waiting in line behind you.
5. Teach your children to not give out personal identifying data to anyone, especially over the web.
GFI LANguard 2011
GFI acts as your own virtual security consultant, offering a comprehensive overview of the state of network security through vulnerability assessment, patch management and network and software audits.
Among the new features in this version:
- Computer-oriented overview first drilling down information from sensors in the network security level of each test result.
- Agent technology quickly scans through load balancing, security, reduced network bandwidth and improved scanning accuracy.
- Review reports of high-performance, computer-oriented, customizable reports.
- Network security history manage your environment by analyzing changes rather than reading long reports.
- Integration with 1500 + in order to identify safety and security applications critical audit to redevelop.
- Text search to quickly scan results for each scanned computer. The research results will be structured and hyperlinks allow a thorough analysis of data.
- Sanitation Centre revised fix vulnerabilities in a central location. Monitor the status of the restoration of jobs and some of the history of all jobs carried out renovation.
- Integration into existing network infrastructure.
- Improved scan the ports of information on the process listening on open ports.
- Custom software / scripts use improvements for supporting auxiliary / configuration files.
- Improved support for virtual infrastructures.
- Network Discovery is not bound to restrictions of the license.
Known Issues
Here is a list of questions that may arise during the beta. These issues will be addressed in beta2.
Here is a list of questions that may arise during the beta. These issues will be addressed in beta2.
- Based on first scan SSH (Linux) is disabled.
- Import settings and the results of the analysis of LANguard 9.x is partially disabled.
- Occasional memory usage spikes may lead to application crash on some computers.
- Integrated Remote Desktop Connections on non-start.
- Enable Remote Desktop on computers running the Remote Registry service is stopped does not work.
- Activity Monitor security scans correctly with this self-remediation for scans that do not collect information patch was conducted.
eScan Anti-Virus 11- Features
Key Features of eScan Anti-Virus 11:
* Modern and simple user interface
* The best protection without slowing down the speed of the computer
* Effective protection in real time all the folders and files on your computer
* Set alerts and warnings during the computer game
* Stop memory-intensive process for laptops
* Integrated protection against all network attacks
* Protect files and folders, edit or delete
* Removing Rootkits and infected files that can not be cleaned in the normal mode of Windows
* Automatic check and download critical updates for Windows operating system from Microsoft
* Provides automatically compressed according to the bandwidth of the updated database of network viruses
The main features of eScan Anti-Virus 1911
* Figure friendly
eScan is a new modern graphical user interface, the needs of novice and experienced users, the simple easy and intuitive to use. Escan new interface consumes minimal system resources and requires less memory than it is to work effectively without processing power.
* Fast on-demand
Demand scan enhanced with new technology whitelisting eScan to reduce processing time and ensure a minimum consumption of system resources. This ensures that the performance of the computer user to lose, even if eScan is a complete scan of your system.
* Scan high real-time to improve your computer against viruses
eScan scans in real time, files, messages and attachments to e-mail and Web traffic with MWL technology, and advanced heuristic algorithm DIRC. It allows you to check the contents of the presence of confidential data, inappropriate content, insults and obscene language. Also uses a touch of self-defense to prevent disabling eScan protects the user's computer for malware attacks, a new generation.
* Experience of play without interruption
eScan 1911 comes with advanced detection mode playback feature (detection of the game), which automatically detects the release of the game. If the game prevents eScan alerts and warnings on the screen of the user with a continuous gameplay.
* A powerful heuristic for proactive security
eScan 1911 has a powerful anti-virus heuristic search algorithm that can identify unknown viruses are constantly being created by hackers and virus writers. It detects and warns the user about applications that suspicious behavior, and thus protects the user against unknown threats and zero-day attacks, "it also allows the user to boot from the network block of executable files and pollution of the network.
* Advanced Anti-Spam
eScan 1911 allows you to effectively block spam with integrated technologies, as a mechanism NILP Education (non-intrusive ways of learning) and an advanced heuristic filters work by analyzing the keywords and phrases specific. NILP uses artificial intelligence to identify patterns of user behavior and classification of e-mails than normal and unwanted (spam).
* Protection of files and lock files user
11 eScan allows users to specific files, including the establishment must be locked, and also the protective function of the record of changes that malware identification.
* Improved Firewall
EScan 1911 Firewall integrates seamlessly integrated into the Windows operating system displays a seventh firewall and records the incoming and outgoing traffic on your computer and protect against all forms of network attacks. In addition, there is a set of predefined rules, access control, in particular, the user can configure to filter network traffic.
* Comprehensive Assessment
eScan 1911 allows users to perform an inventory of resources with a static tool to gather information on the system. This tool provides users with comprehensive information about the hardware and software details.
* Full reports
eScan 1911 has extensive reporting capabilities for each of the modules of the user for a more detailed analysis will be used.
* Effective support remote
EScan eScan Remote Support allows technicians to obtain, if necessary, and with the consent of the user to access the computer remotely and directly with the problem. This helps to support the more secure, faster and better, and increase efficiency.
* Effective Backup and Recovery eScan
eScan eScan 1911 has an automatic backup and restore, you warrant that all important system files and save them in encrypted form possible. If contamination of the file system, the system will automatically restore all the "clean" source files.
* Automatic download critical updates Microsoft
eScan 1911 allows you to automatically check and critical updates for Windows operating systems can be downloaded from the Microsoft Web site, raising the possibility of exploiting the vulnerabilities of the operating system with malware.
Microsoft OneCare Evaluation
For many Pc users the name Microsoft implies lack of security as far as their operating system is concerned. The firm has tried to alter that a lot of occasions in the past, however it seems that since final summer time a a lot more focused and serious effort has been taking place. A key enhance for this effort was also the acquisition of Sybari, a small personal computer security firm based in New York. So, right after Microsoft gained some a lot more expertise in matters of security, it put with each other a mixture of application and companies for the security desires of property users, referred to as Microsoft OneCare.
MS OneCare is just not just an anti-virus and anti-spyware plan. It's mostly a combination of services and software as opposed to a single piece of computer software itself. It supplies protection from viruses and trojans and receives updates from Microsoft's servers for all new forms of viruses. OneCare also incorporates a version of Windows XP firewall which protects PCs from incoming connection requests and also stopping spyware programs currently installed in your Pc from sending their data to their owners. Of course, should you don't want spyware to be installed in your Computer at all, it is most likely far better to use an anti-spyware system along with MS OneCare.
Yet another important feature of MS OneCare is it is backup function. By way of this function, users can create frequent backups of their information in a CD or a DVD. The only point weird about this feature is the fact that it demands users to become subscribed to the service as a way to use it. There exists no apparent information exchange among the plan as well as the firm when performing the backup however it still needs users to be subscribed to the service.
Probably the most crucial function MS OneCare has, nonetheless, is the tune-up function. Through this, OneCare promises to relieve our PCs of redundant files including log files, files which are developed when programs crash, unused DLL files as well as other temporary files. It also defrags your hard drive, which can support lessen the launch time required for an application to start. By which includes the tune-up feature, Microsoft actually sets OneCare apart from the competitors by delivering a answer to an admittedly hard circumstance. There are many programs available claiming to be able to tune-up your Computer but most of them present only minor enhancements and some of them even make matters worse! Microsoft OneCare, nonetheless, appears like a program that will finally get issues right as far as method tune-up is concerned! And even though the permanent deletion of files (no recycle bin) OneCare tune-up does, might appear a bit hazardous, the software program makes confident to notify users of the files it's about to delete prior to taking any action.
One more unusual feature of MS OneCare is the fact that while users are able to decide on amongst performing only a virus check or only a backup, 1 cannot pick parts of the tune-up function. So if you would like a tune-up, you are going to get the total therapy no matter whether you like that or not! This incorporates erasing redundant files, defraging your disk and checking for viruses, which can actually be time-consuming!
Although there's nevertheless space for improvement, Microsoft OneCare is often a really practical resolution for many users and it can enhance the amount of security of one's Computer to quite satisfactory levels. Most importantly, system maintenance, which could be a challenging process even for knowledgeable users, can now be carried out simply and properly.
MS OneCare is just not just an anti-virus and anti-spyware plan. It's mostly a combination of services and software as opposed to a single piece of computer software itself. It supplies protection from viruses and trojans and receives updates from Microsoft's servers for all new forms of viruses. OneCare also incorporates a version of Windows XP firewall which protects PCs from incoming connection requests and also stopping spyware programs currently installed in your Pc from sending their data to their owners. Of course, should you don't want spyware to be installed in your Computer at all, it is most likely far better to use an anti-spyware system along with MS OneCare.
Yet another important feature of MS OneCare is it is backup function. By way of this function, users can create frequent backups of their information in a CD or a DVD. The only point weird about this feature is the fact that it demands users to become subscribed to the service as a way to use it. There exists no apparent information exchange among the plan as well as the firm when performing the backup however it still needs users to be subscribed to the service.
Probably the most crucial function MS OneCare has, nonetheless, is the tune-up function. Through this, OneCare promises to relieve our PCs of redundant files including log files, files which are developed when programs crash, unused DLL files as well as other temporary files. It also defrags your hard drive, which can support lessen the launch time required for an application to start. By which includes the tune-up feature, Microsoft actually sets OneCare apart from the competitors by delivering a answer to an admittedly hard circumstance. There are many programs available claiming to be able to tune-up your Computer but most of them present only minor enhancements and some of them even make matters worse! Microsoft OneCare, nonetheless, appears like a program that will finally get issues right as far as method tune-up is concerned! And even though the permanent deletion of files (no recycle bin) OneCare tune-up does, might appear a bit hazardous, the software program makes confident to notify users of the files it's about to delete prior to taking any action.
One more unusual feature of MS OneCare is the fact that while users are able to decide on amongst performing only a virus check or only a backup, 1 cannot pick parts of the tune-up function. So if you would like a tune-up, you are going to get the total therapy no matter whether you like that or not! This incorporates erasing redundant files, defraging your disk and checking for viruses, which can actually be time-consuming!
Although there's nevertheless space for improvement, Microsoft OneCare is often a really practical resolution for many users and it can enhance the amount of security of one's Computer to quite satisfactory levels. Most importantly, system maintenance, which could be a challenging process even for knowledgeable users, can now be carried out simply and properly.
Protecting Children On the web With Internet Parental Controls
The Globe Wide Internet can provide your young children educational and entertainment choices they can't get anywhere else, but you will need parental controls to assure secure surfing. Learn what you must know.
The Planet Wide Net can be a fascinating place. It has obliterated geography in terms of education and company. It facilitates mastering by permitting children to find out issues and experiences factors of diverse spots they may never get the likelihood to determine inside the non-virtual planet. The internet can bring men and women with each other who otherwise would in no way know one another and generate a virtual universe that's entirely cohesive, with every single sort of info imaginable literally offered at your fingertips. Sounds excellent, does not it?
Regrettably, the net has a dark side. It really is full of material which is inappropriate for youngsters and all sorts of predators. Leaving your kids alone to fend for themselves on the Internet is exactly as hazardous at leaving them inside a crowed airport or buying mall. You don't know where they are going or who with. The news is filled with horror stories about kids who've been taken advantage of online, but you do not want yours to miss out on all of the good aspects of the technology. The primary line of defense in keeping your youngsters save on the Internet would be to teach them the best way to use it safely.
A great deal of on the internet dangers could be dodged just by reminding children of 1 of their earliest learned lessons: do not talk to strangers. The sorts of men and women who desire to harm children have all kinds of tricks up their sleeves. They might try to lull your kid into a false sense of security by pretending to become somebody she knows. Make sure your kid understands that it isn't a fantastic idea to give out private information such as their address, cellphone quantity or the name of their college. The much less information a possible predator has, the harder it is going to be for him to truly locate a victim. It may well be a great notion to set up a secret password and share it only with friends and family so your kid has a way to determine people that are protected to chat with.
Chat interfaces and instant messaging are excellent tools for retaining in touch with buddies and conduct company, but they're also direct connections between your youngster and feasible pedophiles along with other predators. Most immediate messengers have settings that will only permit people on a pre-approved list to method your kid. That way you are able to let the youngsters chat with family and friends even though retaining the bad guys out.
You can't watch your kids every minute they're online, and you can't constantly count on them to accomplish what you've got taught them to complete. Parental control software program is a superb back up. Most browsers will let you to customize age-appropriate settings for every youngster in your house. It is possible to choose what types of Net sites you need your children to access and block them out of the ones you do not. It is a fantastic strategy to provide a virtual safety net for the family. If the parental controls supplied by your World wide web Service Provider, verify into installing further software program which will evaluate every single internet site your kid attempts to access. You set criteria by which the computer software judges every single Net page and assigns a rating, considerably like a movie rating. Your youngsters will only be capable of search at web sites with ratings you have deemed appropriate.
The Planet Wide Net can be a fascinating place. It has obliterated geography in terms of education and company. It facilitates mastering by permitting children to find out issues and experiences factors of diverse spots they may never get the likelihood to determine inside the non-virtual planet. The internet can bring men and women with each other who otherwise would in no way know one another and generate a virtual universe that's entirely cohesive, with every single sort of info imaginable literally offered at your fingertips. Sounds excellent, does not it?
Regrettably, the net has a dark side. It really is full of material which is inappropriate for youngsters and all sorts of predators. Leaving your kids alone to fend for themselves on the Internet is exactly as hazardous at leaving them inside a crowed airport or buying mall. You don't know where they are going or who with. The news is filled with horror stories about kids who've been taken advantage of online, but you do not want yours to miss out on all of the good aspects of the technology. The primary line of defense in keeping your youngsters save on the Internet would be to teach them the best way to use it safely.
A great deal of on the internet dangers could be dodged just by reminding children of 1 of their earliest learned lessons: do not talk to strangers. The sorts of men and women who desire to harm children have all kinds of tricks up their sleeves. They might try to lull your kid into a false sense of security by pretending to become somebody she knows. Make sure your kid understands that it isn't a fantastic idea to give out private information such as their address, cellphone quantity or the name of their college. The much less information a possible predator has, the harder it is going to be for him to truly locate a victim. It may well be a great notion to set up a secret password and share it only with friends and family so your kid has a way to determine people that are protected to chat with.
Chat interfaces and instant messaging are excellent tools for retaining in touch with buddies and conduct company, but they're also direct connections between your youngster and feasible pedophiles along with other predators. Most immediate messengers have settings that will only permit people on a pre-approved list to method your kid. That way you are able to let the youngsters chat with family and friends even though retaining the bad guys out.
You can't watch your kids every minute they're online, and you can't constantly count on them to accomplish what you've got taught them to complete. Parental control software program is a superb back up. Most browsers will let you to customize age-appropriate settings for every youngster in your house. It is possible to choose what types of Net sites you need your children to access and block them out of the ones you do not. It is a fantastic strategy to provide a virtual safety net for the family. If the parental controls supplied by your World wide web Service Provider, verify into installing further software program which will evaluate every single internet site your kid attempts to access. You set criteria by which the computer software judges every single Net page and assigns a rating, considerably like a movie rating. Your youngsters will only be capable of search at web sites with ratings you have deemed appropriate.
Rising PC Doctor 6.0.4.26
Rising PC Doctor, a security tool for professional and smart computer users. With seven important functions of the automatic analysis of malware, vaccination of USB storage devices, the ability of Microsoft Internet Explorer and Windows, Fire Behavior Trojans and unwanted, protection against malicious Web sites, Internet Explorer protection and blocker download Trojan Rising PC Doctor Service will significantly improve your protection against malware and cyber attacks.
Detector Trojans and behavior blockers
Rising PC Doctor can detect the majority of Trojans and other malware even very early, before they can execute their malicious functions. This feature will greatly increase your protection against online threats.
Download trojan blocker
After a successful infection, many viruses will automatically start to download a large number of Trojans and other malware. The Trojan blocking technology of Rising PC Doctor guarantees that the infected computer can not download other viruses and stop the spread of whole families of Trojans.
Automated malware analysis
When starting Rising PC Doctor can automatically scan potentially unknown malware. If permitted by the user, can automatically Malware Malware Analyzer Risings (Automated RsAMA) sent for detailed analysis. The user is informed of the outcome of the event and can respond quickly to new threats to the traditional protection is still not available to respond. Analysis of metadata collected by the user community Rising (Rising Cloud Security), are stored in the database security Rising (RSSD), updated information on Internet security features.
The main functions:
Rising PC Doctor can detect the majority of Trojans and other malware even very early, before they can execute their malicious functions. This feature will greatly increase your protection against online threats.
Download trojan blocker
After a successful infection, many viruses will automatically start to download a large number of Trojans and other malware. The Trojan blocking technology of Rising PC Doctor guarantees that the infected computer can not download other viruses and stop the spread of whole families of Trojans.
Automated malware analysis
When starting Rising PC Doctor can automatically scan potentially unknown malware. If permitted by the user, can automatically Malware Malware Analyzer Risings (Automated RsAMA) sent for detailed analysis. The user is informed of the outcome of the event and can respond quickly to new threats to the traditional protection is still not available to respond. Analysis of metadata collected by the user community Rising (Rising Cloud Security), are stored in the database security Rising (RSSD), updated information on Internet security features.
The main functions:
- Completely revised first vulnerability scanning. The vulnerability analysis of the completely redesigned Rising PC Doctor can Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows, security settings and third-party software from many manufacturers acknowledge. With the ease of use interface allows even novice users are potential vulnerabilities in the operating system and many other major software applications.
- 2nd, Great ability to repair Internet Explorer and Windows. Rising PC Doctor, Internet Explorer on several computers, including home page is malware, adware, or permanent display of many other problems in the grip changed to correct. Rising on computers like PC Doctor can help you repair the system registry, system settings, and the host file.
- 3rd, Powerful process and startup management. This feature gives you greater control over the drivers, startup programs, Active-X controls and other significant influence on the operation of computer software loaded.
- 4th, Advanced tools for experienced users. Rising PC Doctor provides additional tools for experienced users such as disk cleanup, system management mode, service management, application networking, repair LSP, File Shredder and specific tools for suppression should be eliminated only a limited number of viruses.
Other features:
- First Spyware Scan and Removal. Rising PC Doctor detects and completely remove many types of particularly unpleasant spyware from your computer.
- Strong second protection against the latest Trojans. Rising PC Doctor detects and destroys millions of Trojans designed to steal valuable user information streams such as online gaming or online bank accounts.
- 3rd, Privacy Policy. Rising PC Doctor protects your privacy. Rising PC Doctor with inexperienced users can also easily remove potentially sensitive information such as browser and media player history or the list of recently used files in Microsoft Office opens.
Ten Methods to Battle Identity Theft
Latest reports estimate that as numerous as 1 in ten of the population have been a victim of indentity theft, one of many fastest expanding crimes of the final few years. By using various indicates to usurp your identity and pass themselves off as you, the criminals involved go on to commit fraud and theft within your name - leaving you to choose up the pieces afterwards.
The effects on your credit rating may be devastating and usually take years to totally fix, so prevention is naturally much better than cure. Here are ten easy approaches to help you prevent turning into a victim.
1: Be cautious along with your old documents such as paid bills, bank statements, and receipts. Either preserve them safely stored or destroy them if you don't require them anymore. Don't just throw them away, as fraudsters frequently commence stealing an identity by searching for these extremely kinds of documents in household waste. Shredding or burning unneeded papers will prevent this very first step.
2: Store your private documents securely by keeping them someplace out of the sight of visitors to your property.
3: In the event you transform your address, make sure which you inform your bank, utility companies, and everyone else who sends you mail. Documents wrongly sent to a previous address are a favourite target of fraudsters.
4: Make certain that when you quit employing a credit card or bank account, you in fact formally close the account instead of letting it go dormant. Possessing an unused, forgotten about account resurrected by a fraudster might not even be noticed until finally critical damage has been accomplished.
5: Watch your plastic - ensure you know where your credit, debit and ATM cards are, and inform the issuing banks instantly in the event you shed them or they are stolen.
6: If doable transform your PIN numbers and passwords to a thing simply memorable, and Never write them down, particularly not on scraps of paper kept within your purse or wallet.
7: Do not respond to phishing. Banks will never ask you for personal details by way of e mail, and won't ask you for the password to your account. You do not have to 'reconfirm' your particulars following an e-mail request either - just delete the e mail. If in any doubt whatsoever, call your bank to produce sure the request is genuine.
8: Use anti-virus computer software and firewalls in your personal computer, particularly if you use online banking of any sort. Retain the application as much as date aswell to guard against attempts by hackers to find out personal data in your pc.
9: Check your bank account and credit card statements cautiously when you get them, and query together with your bank something that you just can't determine. Spotting a fraud in progress early on will vastly help in minimising the harm it causes.
10: Lastly, keep track of your credit reports often to find out if anything seems that seems odd, like applications for credit cards that you just did not make, or missed payments on finance that you just haven't taken out. Companies are broadly obtainable on-line which can assist you to do this by automatically informing you when a thing on your file alterations.
None of us might be 100% certain that we won't fall victim to the crime of ID Theft, but by taking the measures listed above you will be creating the job of any potential fraudster really hard indeed, and they are most likely to move on to an less complicated target!
The effects on your credit rating may be devastating and usually take years to totally fix, so prevention is naturally much better than cure. Here are ten easy approaches to help you prevent turning into a victim.
1: Be cautious along with your old documents such as paid bills, bank statements, and receipts. Either preserve them safely stored or destroy them if you don't require them anymore. Don't just throw them away, as fraudsters frequently commence stealing an identity by searching for these extremely kinds of documents in household waste. Shredding or burning unneeded papers will prevent this very first step.
2: Store your private documents securely by keeping them someplace out of the sight of visitors to your property.
3: In the event you transform your address, make sure which you inform your bank, utility companies, and everyone else who sends you mail. Documents wrongly sent to a previous address are a favourite target of fraudsters.
4: Make certain that when you quit employing a credit card or bank account, you in fact formally close the account instead of letting it go dormant. Possessing an unused, forgotten about account resurrected by a fraudster might not even be noticed until finally critical damage has been accomplished.
5: Watch your plastic - ensure you know where your credit, debit and ATM cards are, and inform the issuing banks instantly in the event you shed them or they are stolen.
6: If doable transform your PIN numbers and passwords to a thing simply memorable, and Never write them down, particularly not on scraps of paper kept within your purse or wallet.
7: Do not respond to phishing. Banks will never ask you for personal details by way of e mail, and won't ask you for the password to your account. You do not have to 'reconfirm' your particulars following an e-mail request either - just delete the e mail. If in any doubt whatsoever, call your bank to produce sure the request is genuine.
8: Use anti-virus computer software and firewalls in your personal computer, particularly if you use online banking of any sort. Retain the application as much as date aswell to guard against attempts by hackers to find out personal data in your pc.
9: Check your bank account and credit card statements cautiously when you get them, and query together with your bank something that you just can't determine. Spotting a fraud in progress early on will vastly help in minimising the harm it causes.
10: Lastly, keep track of your credit reports often to find out if anything seems that seems odd, like applications for credit cards that you just did not make, or missed payments on finance that you just haven't taken out. Companies are broadly obtainable on-line which can assist you to do this by automatically informing you when a thing on your file alterations.
None of us might be 100% certain that we won't fall victim to the crime of ID Theft, but by taking the measures listed above you will be creating the job of any potential fraudster really hard indeed, and they are most likely to move on to an less complicated target!
maybe we should blame the victim
pardon my iconoclasm, but a twitter conversation with jerome segura and maxim weinstein got me thinking about this. it was sparked by maxim's blog post "stop blaming the victims" where he argued that we shouldn't be blaming people for failing to follow security best practices (such as keeping web servers up to date). personally i consider this to be a form of infantilization. i've argued against coddling users before but i want to expand on the idea here.
the principle and practice of not blaming the users basically sends them the message that they're OK, they didn't do anything wrong, and they can keep doing things the way they have been. this is a marked departure from many of the other messages we send users trying to get them to be more aware of security and to make better decisions in security contexts. that makes the "don't blame the victim" dogma a substantially mixed message. have they really done nothing wrong? often times there are things they could/should have done differently, things they've been told about in the past but still failed to consider. can they be entirely free from responsibility for what happens to them in such a circumstance? i don't believe so. do we really want to send the message that they did nothing wrong and don't have to change? how will we ever get people to take better care of their security if we do that? many people are poorly adapted to the realities of the modern world and if there's no force giving them pushes in the right direction they'll never improve.
more fundamental than that is the fact that victims are victims of the word "victim". by acknowledging someone as a victim we accept and embrace the notion of powerlessness that the word engenders. recognizing people as victims gives them a license to be victims and to remain victims. when someone is taken advantage of we shouldn't be treating them as some helpless and fragile thing, we should be helping them to become empowered so that they don't get taken advantage of again and again and again. by telling them they're helpless victims we rob them of the opportunity to better master their fates and gain confidence in their abilities. perpetuating the notion of the victim keeps the lay-person down.
therefore, not only do i think we should hold people at least partially responsible for the consequences of their actions or inactions (to blame the victim in normal parlance), but i also think we should blame the people who say "don't blame the victim". their well-meaning but ultimately misplaced mollycoddling holds people back and stymies our collective growth and advancement. we can never adapt if we're taught that we can't change our fates.
the principle and practice of not blaming the users basically sends them the message that they're OK, they didn't do anything wrong, and they can keep doing things the way they have been. this is a marked departure from many of the other messages we send users trying to get them to be more aware of security and to make better decisions in security contexts. that makes the "don't blame the victim" dogma a substantially mixed message. have they really done nothing wrong? often times there are things they could/should have done differently, things they've been told about in the past but still failed to consider. can they be entirely free from responsibility for what happens to them in such a circumstance? i don't believe so. do we really want to send the message that they did nothing wrong and don't have to change? how will we ever get people to take better care of their security if we do that? many people are poorly adapted to the realities of the modern world and if there's no force giving them pushes in the right direction they'll never improve.
more fundamental than that is the fact that victims are victims of the word "victim". by acknowledging someone as a victim we accept and embrace the notion of powerlessness that the word engenders. recognizing people as victims gives them a license to be victims and to remain victims. when someone is taken advantage of we shouldn't be treating them as some helpless and fragile thing, we should be helping them to become empowered so that they don't get taken advantage of again and again and again. by telling them they're helpless victims we rob them of the opportunity to better master their fates and gain confidence in their abilities. perpetuating the notion of the victim keeps the lay-person down.
therefore, not only do i think we should hold people at least partially responsible for the consequences of their actions or inactions (to blame the victim in normal parlance), but i also think we should blame the people who say "don't blame the victim". their well-meaning but ultimately misplaced mollycoddling holds people back and stymies our collective growth and advancement. we can never adapt if we're taught that we can't change our fates.
Very best Antivirus - What is the most effective AntiVirus Application to Defend Your Computer
We can call our computer systems our versatile very best pals. In this contemporary globe, absolutely everyone needs a computer. We can do a great deal of factors with our computers. We are able to prepare documents, make, edit and watch videos, listen to music, surf the world wide web, send E-mails, chat with our pals, play games, or even make calls! Computers are very valuable, and when it comes to their costs, they are not cheap. These are the reasons why, just like what we do with our best close friends, we have to defend our computer systems; and we do this with antivirus software program. We retailer crucial files in our computers and we just cannot afford to shed them to spywares, Trojans and other viruses.
There are countless of antivirus computer software accessible in the marketplace today. They will merely not do since we need to want the best antivirus for our valuable computers. So what makes the very best antivirus for our computer systems? 1st, the best antivirus should get updates regularly. This way, it keeps itself well-equipped to cope with the latest menaces to our computer systems.
We create or download files. We also insert CDs and flash disks in our computer systems. All these have possible to lead to danger to our computers. Which is why the scanning capability of the antivirus is also quite crucial to protect our computers from threats. The best antivirus supplies us with all the very best scanning capacity regularly that is dependent upon our choice.
Surfing the world wide web is most likely essentially the most widespread activity we do with our computer systems. You will find web sites, however, that are filled with spywares as well as other threats which will quickly harm our computer systems. The most effective antivirus will safeguard us even from threats coming from the internet sites we use because it can establish probable hazards to our computer systems. The very best antivirus need to also be capable of defend our computer systems from new viruses that are not however registered inside the virus database.
Generating the best option is vital. But you usually do not must do it alone. There are those who can assist you to select the very best antivirus for the pc. You can find organizations and organizations that check antivirus softwares and publish the results in their sites. These testing laboratories ranked Trend Micro, TrustPort, Sophos, Norton, Kaspersky, Nod32, Microsoft, McAfee, Ikarus, ZoneAlarm, WebWasher-GW, Panda, F-Secure, F-Prot, eSscan, Bitdefender, AVK, AVG, Avast, and AntiVir as the greatest antivirus programs obtainable in the market right now. You'll find also sites that run user reviews of diverse antivirus programs.
You can also avail of the totally free trial of different antivirus softwares to check them yourself and discover out what the most beneficial antivirus is. Should you be convinced by the effectiveness of the application, then it is possible to go on and buy it. However, you can find also antivirus softwares which can be downloaded at no cost. This has sprung a debate whether the very best antivirus softwares are free of charge or the ones which you are able to buy. You'll find antivirus programs which you can acquire that have no cost versions. While you will find totally free antivirus which might be efficient, those which it is possible to acquire obviously have benefits.
There are countless of antivirus computer software accessible in the marketplace today. They will merely not do since we need to want the best antivirus for our valuable computers. So what makes the very best antivirus for our computer systems? 1st, the best antivirus should get updates regularly. This way, it keeps itself well-equipped to cope with the latest menaces to our computer systems.
We create or download files. We also insert CDs and flash disks in our computer systems. All these have possible to lead to danger to our computers. Which is why the scanning capability of the antivirus is also quite crucial to protect our computers from threats. The best antivirus supplies us with all the very best scanning capacity regularly that is dependent upon our choice.
Surfing the world wide web is most likely essentially the most widespread activity we do with our computer systems. You will find web sites, however, that are filled with spywares as well as other threats which will quickly harm our computer systems. The most effective antivirus will safeguard us even from threats coming from the internet sites we use because it can establish probable hazards to our computer systems. The very best antivirus need to also be capable of defend our computer systems from new viruses that are not however registered inside the virus database.
Generating the best option is vital. But you usually do not must do it alone. There are those who can assist you to select the very best antivirus for the pc. You can find organizations and organizations that check antivirus softwares and publish the results in their sites. These testing laboratories ranked Trend Micro, TrustPort, Sophos, Norton, Kaspersky, Nod32, Microsoft, McAfee, Ikarus, ZoneAlarm, WebWasher-GW, Panda, F-Secure, F-Prot, eSscan, Bitdefender, AVK, AVG, Avast, and AntiVir as the greatest antivirus programs obtainable in the market right now. You'll find also sites that run user reviews of diverse antivirus programs.
You can also avail of the totally free trial of different antivirus softwares to check them yourself and discover out what the most beneficial antivirus is. Should you be convinced by the effectiveness of the application, then it is possible to go on and buy it. However, you can find also antivirus softwares which can be downloaded at no cost. This has sprung a debate whether the very best antivirus softwares are free of charge or the ones which you are able to buy. You'll find antivirus programs which you can acquire that have no cost versions. While you will find totally free antivirus which might be efficient, those which it is possible to acquire obviously have benefits.
i wandered lonely as a cloud
relax, i'm not about to start waxing poetic about daffodils. rather i'm thinking about cloud-based anti-malware software.
it's something i've been thinking about for a little while now but i've finally decided to commit my thoughts to a more permanent format and share them with others.
for the past couple of years the major anti-malware vendors have been deploying cloud technology to improve the effectiveness of their products. often this has been an optimization specifically for their known malware scanners, although some have also taken the opportunity to build reputation systems.
it occurred to me that the cloud could be used for a great deal more than just that. think about what those reputation systems are doing. the user is faced with a complex question - is file X safe - and the cloud answers. the cloud can do this either because there are experts feeding the cloud it's answers or because there's a community feeding the cloud it's answers (or both, come to think of it). the point is that the cloud reduced the complexity for the user.
now think for a moment about all those technologies that have sprung up and then fallen by the wayside over the years. how many of them fell out of favour because they required too much knowledge, because they asked too much of the user? do you see where i'm heading yet? the cloud as a complexity reducing technology (alright it technically transfers and collates that complexity, but from the user's perspective it reduces it) seems like it actually has the potential to breathe new life in virtually all of those other techniques, be they sandboxing, whitelisting, behaviour blocking, or even integrity checking.
and of course, as i was originally coming up with that list i was reminded of the fact that many of them have actually been augmented with some kind of cloud technology to help take the complexity out of their operation. those efforts simply haven't been particularly mainstream. the biggest vendors have been slow to recognize the opportunity to augment these technologies (which can be superior in the right hands) with complexity reduction as a service. the smaller vendors that are taking a chance with this don't necessarily have the stability to keep it going. it would be nice if those other options saw more more mainstream deployment and adoption.
it's something i've been thinking about for a little while now but i've finally decided to commit my thoughts to a more permanent format and share them with others.
for the past couple of years the major anti-malware vendors have been deploying cloud technology to improve the effectiveness of their products. often this has been an optimization specifically for their known malware scanners, although some have also taken the opportunity to build reputation systems.
it occurred to me that the cloud could be used for a great deal more than just that. think about what those reputation systems are doing. the user is faced with a complex question - is file X safe - and the cloud answers. the cloud can do this either because there are experts feeding the cloud it's answers or because there's a community feeding the cloud it's answers (or both, come to think of it). the point is that the cloud reduced the complexity for the user.
now think for a moment about all those technologies that have sprung up and then fallen by the wayside over the years. how many of them fell out of favour because they required too much knowledge, because they asked too much of the user? do you see where i'm heading yet? the cloud as a complexity reducing technology (alright it technically transfers and collates that complexity, but from the user's perspective it reduces it) seems like it actually has the potential to breathe new life in virtually all of those other techniques, be they sandboxing, whitelisting, behaviour blocking, or even integrity checking.
and of course, as i was originally coming up with that list i was reminded of the fact that many of them have actually been augmented with some kind of cloud technology to help take the complexity out of their operation. those efforts simply haven't been particularly mainstream. the biggest vendors have been slow to recognize the opportunity to augment these technologies (which can be superior in the right hands) with complexity reduction as a service. the smaller vendors that are taking a chance with this don't necessarily have the stability to keep it going. it would be nice if those other options saw more more mainstream deployment and adoption.
quick thought on cyberwarfare
one of the topics that keeps coming up in discussions of cyberwarfare is 'attribution'. that ability to know where an attack came from, who's responsible for it, etc. it keeps coming up because many of us recognize that it's very difficult to do with attacks in cyberspace.
this is a source of confusion for many because our model of warfare involves things like deterrence, counter attack, and appropriate response. without attribution these things aren't possible.
cyberattacks are often likened to missiles or other kinetic warfare weapons where attribution is a much more straightforward process - i think the confusion is rooted in this comparison. instead of thinking about overt warfare, cyberwarfare would be better likened to covert warfare - black ops, wet works, that sort of thing. there is no meaningful attribution with these sort of warfare and so there is no meaningful deterrence or response to such attacks. it is an area of warfare where there is attack without counter attack, where one attacks simply because it is strategically advantageous.
don't picture these so-called cyberweapons as being like electronic missiles that anyone can launch simply by pressing a button, that gives entirely the wrong sort of character to the topic. if you must consider them cyberweapons at all (ie. if you must focus on the tool instead of the attack itself) think of them as guns with silencers on them. or better yet, think of them as knives, used with surgical precision and giving away no clue to those in the vicinity where the attack came from.
this is a source of confusion for many because our model of warfare involves things like deterrence, counter attack, and appropriate response. without attribution these things aren't possible.
cyberattacks are often likened to missiles or other kinetic warfare weapons where attribution is a much more straightforward process - i think the confusion is rooted in this comparison. instead of thinking about overt warfare, cyberwarfare would be better likened to covert warfare - black ops, wet works, that sort of thing. there is no meaningful attribution with these sort of warfare and so there is no meaningful deterrence or response to such attacks. it is an area of warfare where there is attack without counter attack, where one attacks simply because it is strategically advantageous.
don't picture these so-called cyberweapons as being like electronic missiles that anyone can launch simply by pressing a button, that gives entirely the wrong sort of character to the topic. if you must consider them cyberweapons at all (ie. if you must focus on the tool instead of the attack itself) think of them as guns with silencers on them. or better yet, think of them as knives, used with surgical precision and giving away no clue to those in the vicinity where the attack came from.
NETGATE Spy Emergency 9.0.405.0 Review
Spy Emergency is anti-spyware software that fast and secure spyware and other internet infections from your PC away.
Spy Emergency protects against malware, spyware, adware, emote administration tools, homepage hijackers, dialers, keyloggers and many other types of Internet infections.
Spy Emergency supports resident shields for real-time protection, automatic updates of infections database for better protection. Put ideas with Spy Emergency.
Spy Emergency is a security software that protects your PC from spyware, malware and adware.
Use easy-to-use interface, even for inexperienced users Adware
Just three clicks to wash away your problems with Spyware Adware Spy Emergency. By simply clicking the Start button system scan starts immediately. Click Next to review detected items, click the Delete button to delete it.
Light on system resources
Spy Emergency do not slow down your computer and still protects you during working hours are not like other anti-spyware software.
Huge database of signatures
Spy Emergency has more than 985 000 threat definitions in its signature database.
Spy Emergency protects against malware, spyware, adware, emote administration tools, homepage hijackers, dialers, keyloggers and many other types of Internet infections.
Spy Emergency supports resident shields for real-time protection, automatic updates of infections database for better protection. Put ideas with Spy Emergency.
Spy Emergency is a security software that protects your PC from spyware, malware and adware.
Just three clicks to wash away your problems with Spyware Adware Spy Emergency. By simply clicking the Start button system scan starts immediately. Click Next to review detected items, click the Delete button to delete it.
Light on system resources
Spy Emergency do not slow down your computer and still protects you during working hours are not like other anti-spyware software.
Huge database of signatures
Spy Emergency has more than 985 000 threat definitions in its signature database.
In the wild malware removal
You can run Anti-Spyware to save money but these products may not catch really bad stuff and malware and spyware animals, including worms and Trojans. So you need something antispyware weapon like Spy Emergency really is powerful.
Updates to databases Regular
Download updates Small and regular definition significant reduction of the update.
Heuristics detection and real-time protection
With in malware detection heuristics Spy Emergency detects new and unknown malware built into the threat before it by wild virus-scanning and other publishers to be identified to update signatures.
Integration of anti-spyware, anti-malware technologies and anti-spam
Spy Emergency supports not only the detection of malware, adware and spyware, but also detection of malware such as trojans, worms and backdoors. It checks your e-mail not only for malware but for spam messages too with built-in spam filter. When the worm or Trojan horse computer virus is detected, it automatically locks.
You can run Anti-Spyware to save money but these products may not catch really bad stuff and malware and spyware animals, including worms and Trojans. So you need something antispyware weapon like Spy Emergency really is powerful.
Updates to databases Regular
Download updates Small and regular definition significant reduction of the update.
Heuristics detection and real-time protection
With in malware detection heuristics Spy Emergency detects new and unknown malware built into the threat before it by wild virus-scanning and other publishers to be identified to update signatures.
Integration of anti-spyware, anti-malware technologies and anti-spam
Spy Emergency supports not only the detection of malware, adware and spyware, but also detection of malware such as trojans, worms and backdoors. It checks your e-mail not only for malware but for spam messages too with built-in spam filter. When the worm or Trojan horse computer virus is detected, it automatically locks.
Here are some key features of "Spy Emergency":
* Built-in proactive resident shield protection with dynamic heuristic engine that can even detect new and unknown Internet threats
* Lowlevel Anti-rootkit Protection
* Scan of your registry
* Extended behavioral heuristic scanning
* Support for Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox and Opera browsers
* Site Identity Verifier
* Built-in proactive resident shield protection with dynamic heuristic engine that can even detect new and unknown Internet threats
* Lowlevel Anti-rootkit Protection
* Scan of your registry
* Extended behavioral heuristic scanning
* Support for Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox and Opera browsers
* Site Identity Verifier
* Scan of your system memory
* System directory storage scan
* Scan of your storage
* Built-in anti-spam
* Hijackers scan
* Tracking cookies scan
* Host file scan
* Command line interface
* Heuristic malware detection
* Polymorhic malware detection
* Generic unpacker with support for UPX, Aspack, ...
* Browser shields, including homepage shield
* Automatic LSP stack repair
* Real-time memory shields that blocks spyware before it executes
* Prevention shields that blocks malware installation
* News updates
* Tracking cookies shields
* Automatic incremental database updates
* Keeplist
* Individual items restore functionality
* Handy Shell Extension Scanning
* Scheduling support
* Intuitive and clear user interface for spyware removal
* Simple configuration
* Skin support
* Language support
* System directory storage scan
* Scan of your storage
* Built-in anti-spam
* Hijackers scan
* Tracking cookies scan
* Host file scan
* Command line interface
* Heuristic malware detection
* Polymorhic malware detection
* Generic unpacker with support for UPX, Aspack, ...
* Browser shields, including homepage shield
* Automatic LSP stack repair
* Real-time memory shields that blocks spyware before it executes
* Prevention shields that blocks malware installation
* News updates
* Tracking cookies shields
* Automatic incremental database updates
* Keeplist
* Individual items restore functionality
* Handy Shell Extension Scanning
* Scheduling support
* Intuitive and clear user interface for spyware removal
* Simple configuration
* Skin support
* Language support
Antivirus LiveCD 8 in 1 NEO
If the actions of malware, it is impossible, a computer with Windows or Unix, the reset of the affected system made with Dr.Web LiveCD free!
1st- Dr.Web LiveCD will not only deleted from your computer infected and suspicious files, but also to protect sensitive information on removable media or another infected computer and attempts to copy objects disinfected.
2nd- Kaspersky Rescue Disk 1910 (217 MB)
Kaspersky Rescue Disk 10 - Special program to scan and disinfect infected computers x86 and x64-compatible. The program is used when the extent of the infection if it is not possible, your computer with antivirus programs or processing tools (such as Kaspersky Virus Removal Tool) to heal, running the operating system.
The effectiveness of treatment is that in the system are malicious programs do not get a grip extends at boot time. While disaster recovery is available only on the problem of testing equipment and updating of databases and back and updates the statistics.
3rd- AVG Rescue CD (92 MB)
AVG Rescue CD - antivirus boot disk for recovery of Windows systems, start-up can not or have lost this ability due to infection from viruses or malware.
4th- BitDefender Rescue CD (362 MB)
BitDefender Rescue CD scans and removes viruses and other malicious software on all hard drives, before the operating system to load on Windows. The boot disk for recovery is used when the system can not be loaded or not working properly because the computer is infected with malware. This can occur if the computer virus protection software is installed.
5th- Avira AntiVir Rescue System (226 MB)
Avira AntiVir Rescue System enables users of data stored on your computer when you start can not access the system. Thus, with the help of this program, you can:
Restore a damaged system,
Data Warehouse
Scanning for viruses and malware.
6th- ESET LiveCD (201 MB)
ESET NOD32 LiveCD - a boot disk that allows you to quickly start to recover your computer after the operating system to retirement.
In addition, ESET NOD32 LiveCD guaranteed to remove viruses, potentially dangerous files and sophisticated malware that could be neutralized in normal mode.
7th- F-Secure CD 3.11 (120 MB)
F-Secure Rescue CD - antivirus rescue CD is based on the Linux operating system scans your computer and install the extension. Virus for all files containing malware.
8th- VBA32 Rescue
This product allows you to disarm the malicious (and suspicious) software on the computer of the user with the greatest effect. Scanning and processing, are independent of the operating system installed on your computer. For this reason, the malware will not be able to thwart the process of neutralization.
User
1-Format the USB stick first of Hpusbfw.exe program the FAT32 file system.
Program Hpusbfw.exe also a flash drive bootable.
2-Unzip the contents of the second distribution to the root of the key.
3- Restart your computer and select USB in the BIOS or press F10 at startup (F2, F12 or another key to select the boot device - depending on the motherboard) to start.
If for any reason your flash drive did not boot, you can try to do the following:
1). Download
http://download.gna.org/grubutil/grubinst-1.1-bin-w32-2008-01-01.zip
2). Apply grubinst_gui.exe to stick
Year: 2011
Version: 1 Build 0
Developer: Various
Bit depth: 32bit
Compatible with Windows 7: full
System requirements: PC-compatible computer
Download (Oron)
http://oron.com/ri3nm2u0nkcx/AntiVirus.LiveCD.8in1.part1.rar.html
http://oron.com/riu8klr8r2mf/AntiVirus.LiveCD.8in1.part2.rar.html
http://oron.com/83crf7ljtb7j/AntiVirus.LiveCD.8in1.part3.rar.html
http://oron.com/np0s45ilwd1p/AntiVirus.LiveCD.8in1.part4.rar.html
Download (Wupload)
http://www.wupload.com/file/4182383
http://www.wupload.com/file/4182313
http://www.wupload.com/file/4182316
http://www.wupload.com/file/4182312
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